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Timothy F.  Bresnahan, Paul Milgrom, and Jonathan Paul 
A stock analyst, unhappy with his job, went to lunch with an officer of  a 
competing pension fund. The analyst made his case carefully, explaining 
which of his material was being ignored,  and  what  lesser material  from 
others was guiding actual trading. The officer, who had no intention of hir- 
ing the analyst, picked up the check. Who paid for the lunch? 
Over the last three decades, trading on stock exchanges has been growing at a 
growing rate.  In  1960, 958 million  shares of  stock were traded on the New 
York  Stock Exchange  (NYSE).  By  1970, this had roughly tripled  to 3,124 
million.  By  1987, the volume had grown another  15-fold to 48,144 million 
shares, and the NYSE was planning for a potential  billion-share day by the 
early 1990s.’  This pattern of accelerating growth is even stronger on the newer 
exchanges on which the shares of smaller firms are traded.  The volume on 
NASDAQ grew from 1,390 million shares traded in 1975 to 37,890 million 
in  1987. The acceleration  is even  more  marked  if  we  consider the  recent 
growth in stocklike instruments such as options. 
A trade of  a share of stock is not a constant unk2  In figure 5.1, we show 
the growth in the deflated dollar value of trades on U.S.  securities markets. 
The line labeled “stocks” is the total market value of  trades on all the stock 
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1. For recent stock-exchange data on the NYSE and the NASDAQ,  see the 1989 Statistical 
Abstract ofthe United States, tables 830 and 831. The 1960 number is taken from the 1961 U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission AnnualReport, table 9, p. 219. 
2. Stock splitting behavior tends to keep the nominal value of the average share traded roughly 
constant in the intermediate run. 
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exchanges  registered  with  the  Securities and  Exchange  Commi~sion.~  The 
line  labeled  “stocks,  etc.”  includes  nonstock  securities;  warrants,  rights, 
equity options (whether traded or exercised) and trades in nonequity options. 
The deflator for the figure is an extremely conservative one, the value of the 
Standard and Poor’s 500 portfolio over time.4  Clearly, the figure shows a dra- 
matic change in the rate of growth of trading, partly driven by the expansion 
in nonstock but equitylike securities. Overall, the rate of growth of trades in 
the figure is 8 percent per annum, but the later periods clearly show more rapid 
growth. If we were to use a less conservative deflator for the figure, such as 
the GNP deflator, it would show an even more dramatic acceleration. 
The growth in trading was accompanied by rapid growth in inputs at stock 
exchange member firms. Figure 5.2  displays selected inputs into NYSE mem- 
ber firms for the period beginning in 1971  .s The solid line shows total expend- 
itures in  1987 dollars, using the GNP deflator. The line with asterisks shows 
registered  representatives,  that is, broker personnel.  (This series is not avail- 
able for 1984). This period of rapid trading growth was also a period of rapid 
growth in the resources  consumed by  the  sector. These resources primarily 
3.  See, e.g., table 18A of the 1986 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission AnnualReporf. 
col. 2, and corresponding tables in earlier annual reports. 
4. The advantage of this deflator is that it standardizes the unit of traded stock to remove the 
problems associated with  stock splitting, etc. It overdeflates because the real rate of interest is 
built into stock returns in the long run. 
5. For  1971-83,  the data come from the annual NYSE Fact Book, later, from the Securities 
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produce  intermediate outputs; trading  services, knowledge  and  analysis  to 
support trading decisions, and sales efforts. 
What is the real output of the stock exchange? Has it grown as dramatically 
as figure 5.1 suggests? These are the issues addressed in this paper.  Our in- 
quiry focuses on several related analytical issues arising in the nature of the 
changes in stock exchange activity in recent years. 
Baumol (1965) lists five ways in which the operations of securities markets 
produce a social output. For our purposes, we classify these into three admin- 
istrative and two informational outputs. The administrative outputs are access 
to capital, liquidity, and low administration costs. The existence of  securities 
markets permits any particular enterprise to be owned by many small capital- 
ists, each diversified. This permits the sharing of risk. Further, the capitalists 
can have a shorter time horizon than the enterprise; the existence of a price at 
which the individual can sell shares means that the investment is liquid. The 
additional liquidity may reduce risk as well as lower investor costs. Finally, 
when  compared with other forms of  financial intermediation, the securities 
exchanges can involve considerably less administrative effort for the transfer 
of funds. 
The informational outputs of the exchange are twofold. The importance of 
each output depends on the belief that securities prices reflect fundamentals, 
that is, the expected future earnings stream of  the enterprise. First, informa- 
tion about the firm's  prospects could be useful to investors in their effort to 
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tor, whether individual or institution, that information is potentially useful in 
deciding whether (and at what level) to continue to invest in the firm. For a 
particular firm’s investors taken as a group, it is useful in selecting, evaluat- 
ing, and compensating managers.  Second, because  stock  prices  are  infor- 
mative,  they  offer  guidance to business management-information  on the 
current cost of capital which  is so important in determining  the level of in- 
vestment which it is appropriate for the firm to undertake. Thus, the securities 
markets could usefully  transfer  information  out of  the firm to investors,  or 
reflect information (presumably  known by some investor) that management 
would not otherwise know. 
The dramatic increase in trading volume on the stock exchanges might have 
represented an increased service along any or all of these five dimensions. The 
origins and form of the increase in trading suggest the importance of  the two 
informational dimensions. The increase is happening worldwide-not  just in 
the United States. In the United States, it is driven by very rapid technological 
change based on the use of telecommunications equipment and computers and 
by the  1975 deregulation  of stock brokerage. The technological effects have 
been much the same outside the United States, but deregulation has played a 
much smaller role until recently. 
The new  technologies  and deregulation  have  made trading cheaper.  The 
technologies let individual traders in brokerage houses more closely monitor 
and react to events in and affecting  the markets.  Today, they have Quotron 
terminals and Unix workstations to follow many different sources of  informa- 
tion and act on them. The deregulation  and technology let investors outside 
brokerage  houses trade  more cheaply  at the margin.  The exchanges them- 
selves have accommodated the traders’ desire for rapid response  with elec- 
tronic market infrastructure. The NASDAQ small-order execution system and 
the NYSE direct order transmission system are examples that permit reason- 
ably direct computerized trading. One effect of these lower costs is that more 
traders  in more countries participate  in globalized  markets.  This creates  an 
opportunity to execute very large trades quickly and without much effect on 
price-increased  liquidity in the short term. 
These changes create opportunities for traders to get and use information 
about companies and about the market. When a trader can easily take and later 
liquidate a large position, there are opportunities to earn an expected profit on 
even a small information  advantage.  As a result,  traders pursue ever smaller 
arbitrage opportunities, better analysis of  public information,  and (illegal as 
well as legal) private information. 
One response  to this increased  liquidity is the systematic pursuit of arbi- 
trage opportunities. Wall Street “quants” perform computer intensive research 
not unlike that of professors  of  finance. The quants’ goals, however, are to 
find systematic departures from theory and then to trade on them. Increasing 
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ploited.  Competition among potential traders means that,  over time,  only 
smaller and smaller departures persist. 
Similar opportunities exist on the fundamental side of  securities research 
and trading. A trader who can anticipate the contents and implications of  a 
public announcement about a company can usually make a profit. Increased 
liquidity and lowered transactions costs mean that it is increasingly valuable 
to expend resources on anticipation of public announcements. The analyst’s 
research activity is the more valuable, the more correct it is and the more 
unique it is; something known to everyone is already reflected in the stock 
price. As a result, competition among research analysts and traders leads to 
the pursuit of a  priori less and less promising fundamental analysis. The mar- 
ginal fundamental research project always earns zero expected return on the 
costs of gathering and processing the information about the company. As with 
the quantitativekbitrage research efforts, the competition among analysts and 
traders can take two forms. The analyst can attempt to get to a better answer 
than  analysts  at  other  trading  houses.  This  typically  takes  either  better- 
informed or smarter analysts; the former are expensive, the latter subject to 
rapidly diminishing returns. The other form of  competition involves getting 
to the answer more rapidly and trading on it earlier. This form of competition 
is a very effective destroyer of rents. But it suggests a substantial increase in 
the speed with which information is impounded in security prices. 
The nature of  the changes in securities markets suggests two directions of 
increase in the real output of the exchange: The first is the direct effects of 
lowered trading costs on the administrative outputs of  the exchanges. The 
second is the indirect effects of increased informativeness of the prices of se- 
curities. It appears unlikely that either effect represents a large increase in the 
real output of the securities exchanges. Almost all of our formal argument is 
concerned with the informativeness effects, but we will briefly review the ad- 
ministrative effects here. 
Trading costs are not primarily costs of owning publicly traded companies 
or costs of the existence of  publicly held companies. A buy-and-hold life- 
cycle investor, for example, gains only incrementally from the decline in trad- 
ing costs over the last decade and a half. Thus enterprises can be owned by  a 
broad range of well-diversified investors either before or after the trading cost 
decline. The administrative effects seem likely to be second order.6 
The value of quicker incorporation of information in stock prices is a more 
6. The increased liquidity of the exchanges does provide some benefits, such as opportunities 
to  rebalance  portfolios at  lower cost. In  an  economy  with  identical  stockholders, equilibrium 
portfolio balancing involves no trades. But in an economy with stockholders in  diverse tax cir- 
cumstances, the lowered trading costs may permit more effective use of the securities markets to 
engage in tax-lowering trades. These, depending on one’s view of the tax code, either usefully 
broaden the base of capital  taxation or destroy useful attempts to tax  favor particular types of 
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difficult question. We ultimately conclude that this, too, likely represents an 
unimportant improvement  in the output of  the stock exchanges. But to reach 
this conclusion we need a more careful treatment of  the potential social gains 
to informative stock prices. If outside analysts research companies more, and 
if much of the information they discover is reflected in the price of the stock, 
who finds this information useful and how? We  will provide models of both 
of  the two information  flows discussed  above, that  to investors and that to 
management. 
The question of the value of  information in stock prices is a difficult one in 
no small part because of the plausibility of the hypothesis that the stock mar- 
ket should have grown more informative over the last decade. Many firms in 
the United  States, facing increased  worldwide  competition,  have felt them- 
selves to be in a more difficult environment. It is a cliche of  the  1980s that 
firms need to refocus on decision making for the long term and on competi- 
tiveness. These are times in which it is quite plausible that improved mecha- 
nisms  for aligning  management and  shareholder  interests  on  the long run 
could be particularly valuable. It is also plausible that, in apparently unsettled 
times, the stock price could communicate more things to management that it 
does not know.’ 
In what follows, we provide separate but similar analyses of the two infor- 
mational hypotheses: (1) more informative securities prices better align inves- 
tor and management incentives; and (2)  better information in securities prices 
inform management about  investment prospects. In both  cases, we  assume 
that the stock grows more informative because of outsider traders. These are 
self-interested investors who gather information about companies and trade in 
their securities in the hopes of private gain. 
We use a standard model of information gathering and trading in the stock 
market, that of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). In their model, the incentive to 
gather  information  about  companies arises because  informed  investors can 
trade on it.  Because they do trade on the information, equilibrium  price is 
correlated with the information; by this mechanism, the securities market can 
grow more informative. Rational expectations by other investors limit the size 
of their trading gains, however. Information that traders gather and trade on is 
reflected partially in stock prices, partially in expected profits to the informed 
trader. The more investors know something, or the larger position informed 
investors  take, the more the  information  tends  to be revealed  by the  stock 
price.  In equilibrium, the number of  traders who become informed is deter- 
mined  by the cost of  gathering the information  and the return.  At a market 
equilibrium, so many traders become  informed  that they drive the return to 
information (suitably adjusted for risk) down to the cost. This model provides 
7. Of course, it is also a clichC of this period that the stock market does none of these things, 
but rather the reverse, by focusing companies on short-run returns. This is a point to which we 
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us with a way to understand the part of the problem concerning information 
gathering by outsider traders. 
There are a number of ways in which more rapid or more complete reflec- 
tion of  information about companies in stock prices could be a socially valu- 
able output: (1) stock market prices are often used in compensation contracts 
for high company officials; better information might make this principal-agent 
problem go better;  (2)  the stock market  serves to guide investment.  Better 
information  might guide it to better uses; and (3) takeovers,  leveraged  buy 
outs, and so on, might provide discipline in management that would be more 
effective with better public information.  By building models of (1) and (2), 
we argue that any beneficial effects are likely be small.  Our arguments will 
clearly not apply to takeovers. 
Theories of corporate officers’ Compensation suggest that use of  the stock 
price can align officers’ and stockholders’ interests. There may be substantial 
costs of  waiting to compensate officers on the basis of  how their decisions 
actually  work  out in  the future. Instead, the argument  goes, the  forward- 
looking character of the stock price lets the compensation  be done closer to 
the decision point. This leads to an interesting puzzle. Many managers appear 
to believe that compensating them with stock tends to focus them on the pres- 
ent, not the future. Rather than encouraging high-payoff investments in R&D 
or other long-lived assets, the stock market encourages managers to show im- 
mediate profits. Further, this tendency has been getting stronger over time. As 
the managers see it, the markets are systematically shortsighted. Their irratio- 
nality translates into an irrational compensation scheme. 
The managers, it turns out, are very likely right about everything but the 
irrationality. In  the next section, we present  a simple model  of  managerial 
compensation, a model based on the price established in a fully rational stock 
market.  In the compensation model, managers’  and stockholders’ goals are 
not necessarily identical. Shareholders care only about their return; managers 
care only about their compensation and the effort they expend to get it. The 
incentive contract  offered the managers  uses the stock price to  compensate 
them. To the extent the stock price reflects the future value of  the firm, this 
tends to make the gap between  shareholder  and manager  interests  smaller. 
Managerial  attention  might, for example, be directed  either  to R&D or to 
making the quarterly earnings report look right. The first activity is high pay- 
off, difficult to evaluate, and uncertain; the second is the reverse. A good in- 
centive contract  rewards  the first and ignore  the second. Our model  deter- 
mines whether the self-interested information-gathering  and trading behavior 
of  stock-market participants,  who might gather information about either man- 
agerial activity and trade on it, leads to such a contract. 
For the purpose of compensating the managers, shareholders would like the 
stock price to reflect the R&D management activity more, the earnings report 
less. But investor research may have the reverse effect. The stock market equi- 
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valuable activity. Although we show this result precisely below,  it is easy to 
anticipate its intuition here. From the point of view of the compensation con- 
tract, one would like the stock price to reflect managers’ value added. But that 
is not what traders care about; they want to know about the value of the firm. 
In both gathering information and trading on it, their incentives lead them to 
the wrong activity. 
Our analysis of the way the stock market guides investment is similar. The 
role of  information is different here. There is information about the firms’ 
prospects not known to the firms’ officers or directors. The market, by  dis- 
playing  a large q (Tobin  1969; Hayashi  1982), can signal the need for an 
expansion of the firms’ capital stock. 
Our  analysis of  this  situation closely  parallels the  previous one.  Once 
again, we distinguish between two different pieces of  information to gather 
and trade on. One of these concerns the value of the firms’ existing projects; 
the other, the value of the incremental investment project. To guide investment 
correctly, the market would have to emphasize the latter information. Once 
again, the reverse is true; for the case of a small incremental project, stochast- 
ically independent of existing projects, the stock price reflects only the value 
of existing projects. 
Once again, the intuition is clear. Traders care about the value of the firm, 
which may be determined overwhelmingly by existing projects. They are not 
necessarily interested in the value added of the incremental project. 
5.1  Real-Side Decisions, Managerial Agency, and the Long-Run Value 
of the Firm 
The first value-of-information issue can be addressed in a basic principal- 
agent model of relationships between the owners of a firm and its stockhold- 
ers. The classic approach to this problem combined three elements.* First, 
managers’ and shareholders’ incentives are not aligned a priori; managerial 
effort needs to be elicited by incentives under moral hazard. Second, the board 
of  directors is sophisticated in setting the managerial compensation scheme 
but is limited in what it can observe; compensation is based on observable 
indicators of the efects of managers’ actions, not on the actions themselves. 
Although the board cannot observe the manages’ actions, it correctly antici- 
pates the effect of  incentives on managerial actions. Our model also has ra- 
tional expectations in another sense. The stock price is equal to the present 
value of per-share earnings, adjusted for risk and deducting any managerial 
compensation. This equation is not an identity that managers take as given. 
Rather, it is an equilibrium condition. 
8. Cf. Wilson (1969). Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), and Ross (1973). Our modeling details 
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The value of stock market information for managerial compensation can be 
addressed in this framework with two simple changes. First, we give the stock 
market itself an explicit informational role. We  follow Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980),  Hellwig (1980),  and Admati and Pfleiderer (1987) by  introducing out- 
side traders who can research the firm and trade on the results of  their re- 
search. We  use the standard model in  which outside traders’ information is 
partially revealed by the stock price. If  it were fully revealed, there would be 
no incentive for research. To capture the long-rudshort-run distinction of our 
introduction, we  also model the outsiders as capable of  researching any of 
several different aspects of the firm. This also leads immediately to our other 
novel feature. We let managers choose a vector of activities, not a single effort 
level. Thus, the model has a rich enough logical structure to permit statements 
like “outsiders research short-run earnings, not long-run prospects, so man- 
agers direct their efforts to the short run.” 
We  make  specific assumptions about functional forms and distributions, 
following the literature. In  particular, both shareholders and managers have 
constant absolute risk aversion preferences about wealth, and managers’ util- 
ity is separable in wealth and effort. The joint distribution of the future value 
of the firm and all signals observed by outside traders is normal. 
Ultimately, the firm will have earnings 
v = f(x)  + cioi, 
where x is a vector of choice variables for management, and 0 is a random 
term outside anyone’s control. These revenues are discounted to the present. 
For our application, it is natural to think off(x)  + 0 as being calculated from 
the sum of present earnings, y,, and the present value of  future earnings, y,. 
Both y, and y,  depend on x, perhaps differently, and the sum of their random 
components is 0.  The managedagent picks x, and bears some private effort 
costs, c(x), in doing so. So far, we closely follow the usual agent-theoretical 
models of  managerial compensation, except that x is a vector. The problem 
for the directors/shareholders, then, is be slightly more complex than usual. 
They need to elicit not only overall managerial effort, but the right mix of the 
different efforts, x.~ 
We follow the literature by assuming that compensation cannot be based on 
x, which is fundamentally unobservable, or on  L!  which is observed too late. 
Instead, compensation is based on the current stock price, I?  The intuition 
held by both economists and practitioners has been that P reflects all publicly 
available  information  about  V  Thus,  under  a  fundamentals or  efficient- 
markets theory of  how  P  is set,  management’s incentives are aligned with 
shareholders. 
9. The effort variables,  x,  are  naturally unitless, and we have written bothflx) and  c(x)  as 
arbitrary functions. Clearly, there is an arbitrary normalization here. We  could writeAx*) = Z, 
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The net compensation of the manager is given by: 
(2)  T(P) -  c(x), 
where T(P)  is a transfer or compensation function. We assume T is linear, T(P) 
=  to +  t, !?lo  In  this  framework,  x is  subject  to moral  hazard.  A  self- 
interested manager will set xi  to maximize expected monetary income minus 
effort costs, adjusted for risk. In certainty-equivalent terms, this is 




-  t: u;. 
The last term is the risk premium in the manager’s  compensation.  Because 
higher x  generally leads to a higher mean price, (3) does represent an incentive 
contract. As long as the managers’ coefficient of  absolute risk aversion, a, is 
positive,  the  solution  t, =  1 and to = - E[U is not  optimal, because  it 
requires the managers to bear too much risk. 
We assume that directors, in setting T(P),  act in the long-run interests of all 
shareholders.  They will pick the function T( .) to maximize the appropriately 
risk-adjusted terminal value of  the firm. We will return to the details of this 
problem. 
In the standard model with exogenous information, x  is set by the managers 
according to (3). The stock price is set by 
(4)  P  = E[V  1  x] -  T(P) - (shareholders’ risk premium): 
because constant shareholder risk  aversion implies linearity in E[U and ra- 
tional expectations implies the value of the firm is calculated at the managers’ 
equilibrium action. Finally, to and t, are set by the board to maximize share- 
holder welfare  subject to (3). Except  in some special cases (certainty,  risk- 
neutral manager), the equilibrium does not attain the first best. Perhaps better 
information from an active set of researcheriinvestors would help. 
5.2  Investor Preferences and Stock-Market Equilibrium 
We let the informativeness of P about V be endogenous. Individual or insti- 
tutional investors can research  different aspects of  V and then trade on that 
information. We assume that in performing these activities, investors are self- 
interested. They trade on their research information only to the extent it gives 
them a  risk-adjusted  return. They only do research  that  leads to profitable 
trades. We will follow Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) in modeling one effect of 
10. This can be justified as corresponding to an optimal choice when the model is regarded as 
the reduced form of a more detailed, dynamic formulation. See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). 
11.  There  are no investment bankers  or raiders on boards forcing  shortsightedness  in  our 
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this activity. The more informed investors trade, the more P reflects their re- 
search efforts. If other investors have rational expectations, they use the infor- 
mation  in P  This limits the private value of research. In our treatment,  the 
increased informativeness  of  P has a second spillout; the board of directors 
can use it in a compensation contract. 
The research possibilities are about different aspects of  V We assume that 
investors are grouped in types, i, each of which can research a particular as- 
pect.’* For clarity,  we link each research  aspect to a particular  managerial 
effort level, x,. In particular,  we assume an informed  investor of  type  i ob- 
serves, 
(5) 
This is an imperfect signal of  the effort x,  because it contains noise. It is also 
an incomplete signal of the ultimate value of the firm. Because 
y; = x;  + 0,. 
v =Ax) + c, o,, 
any particular research project bears on only a particular aspect, such as the 
current or future earnings of the firm. Our assumption that there are multiple 
nontrivial  signals and that any particular  investor sees at most one of these 
means that each informed investor is still somewhat uncertain about V Thus 
no risk-averse investor takes infinitely large positions in the security. We will 
investigate two different problems: a short-run problem in which the amount 
of research being done is fixed and a long-run problem in which research is 
endogenous. 
We assume that investors are risk averse and that they have constant abso- 
lute risk aversion.  An investor’s utility function over ex post wealth is U(W) 
=  -exp(  -aW)  where a is the coefficient of  (absolute) risk aversion. This 
specific form of preferences  is helpful because it, together with competitive 
rational expectations and normally distributed errors, implies a linear asset- 
demand equation. An investor who observes signal yi  demands stock accord- 
ing to 
The numerator in (7) is the investor’s expected return on a share of stock. A 
positive  signal leads informed investors to  take a long position,  a negative 
signal to short. The denominator is risk  aversion times the variance  of  the 
12.  This is an assumption of  convenience. Models in which investors choose research projects, 
possibly pursuing several, have been investigated by Admati and Pfleiderer (1987). These models 
quickly become extremely technically complex. Price-taking investors who research multiple pro- 
jects would add little to our treatment. Takeover investors who investigate everything and mount 
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investor’s risky return. Investors with better research (i.e., smaller variances 
around ultimate value) take larger positions. I3 
Why are both numerator and denominator in (7) written as depending on P 
as well? In rational-expectations  equilibrium, P reveals some of  the informa- 
tion about y,. Suppose that the results of one particular kind of  analysis,  for 
example, y,, suggests low future stock value. Researcheriinvestors who see yI 
dump the stock, and its price will therefore be lower: As a result, P incorpo- 
rates some of the information in the y,.  This dependence could be exploited by 
an uninformed investor who demands 
The dependence between the price of  the stock and researchers’ information 
is also the reason the board can use P as an input in managerial compensation, 
as we shall see. 
To  investigate the informativeness  of the stock price as a signal of the re- 
search’s contents, we now examine the equilibrium price equation. Each in- 
formed investor of type i behaves according to (7); let there be A, such inves- 
tors. (For the moment, we assume A is exogenous.) Similarly, let there be A, 
uninformed investors, and let the demand by noise traders be z. Normalize by 
1 -  A,,  = C,A,. Then price solves the zero net supply equation: 
(9) 
Because (9) is linear, P  is a linear function of the y,  and z, and thus normal. 
The variance of P and its covariance with they, are determined by (7) - (9). 
This relationship is simple to understand if we write out (7) and (8) explic- 
itly. Let pi.,  be the coefficient of P when V is regressed on P and y, , and let & 
be the coefficient of y,. Write the manager’s  compensation  T(P)  as to + t,P 
Then, 
0 = Auq,(P) + 2,  A,q,(R Y,)  + z. 
Because an informed investor of type  i can observe both y, and R  she can 
condition  on both.  Both  are valuable  information; P  contains  information 
about other traders’  information. The relation  between  signal y, and trading 
behavior  depends  on  two things;  @,  which  measures 6E[V I  *]/6y,, and 
a2(V  I -),  which measures the risk borne by a type-i trader. 
Similarly, 
13.  Following Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). we write the problem as if the stock of the firm at 
hand were the only risky asset in the economy. Admati and Pfleiderer (1987) treat the case of  an 
investor demanding a portfolio of different securities. Although the definition of  the riskiness of  a 
further investment in a particular firm is changed by the portfolio treatment, the fundamental parts 
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E[VI  + pi  P - P - to - t,P 
a u*(V  I P)  (11)  9" = 
where pvp  is the coefficient of P in a regression for V with no other regressors. 
Uninformed traders can condition only on the information revealed in 19  They 
are always at greater risk than informed traders, because u2(V  I P) is necessar- 
ily larger than u2(V  1 yi, P). 
The distribution of P in equilibrium is then determined by 
where 
hi (pii - t, - 1)  X,(pi -  t, - 1)  +  * = 
au2 (V I yi, P)  a u2  (V 1  P) 
.  (13) 
5.3  The Alignment of Shareholder and Manager Interest 
Knowing that research and investment leads to cov(y,,P) > 0, and wanting 
to reward xi,  a value-maximizing board of directors will set managerial com- 
pensation to depend on 19  They anticipate that managers will supply effort in 
order to earn stock-price-based  income. The board's problem is to maximize 
shareholder well-being subject to (3)  and subject to Urn  2  U,,  the manager's 
opportunity salary. 
This problem takes the form 
max A,V~  + Cihivj 
ro.  11. 
x s.t. (3)  urn  u,. 
That completes our statement of the model. 
The ingredients  of  the  model,  then,  are  threefold.  Managers  are  self- 
interested  and need an incentive contract to align their interests with share- 
holders. The functionf(x) -  c(x) need not be symmetric, so some activities 
can be more valuable than others. The management incentive contract should 
focus attention on those activities. The second ingredient is that investors are 
self-interested.  They research those activities of the firm on which they can 
hope to make profits as informed outsider traders in informationally efficient 
markets. The third ingredient is the board, which maximizes shareholder wel- 
fare. 
5.4  Exogenous Number of Informed 'Ikaders 
The problem would become easier if the stock price came to incorporate 
more information about the more important managerial efforts, x,. In (12), we 
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number of informed traders of  type i, A,,  and on the equilibrium behavior of 
informed  and uninformed traders. The coefficient of y, in the price equation 
(12) is proportional  to its coefficient in type-i investors’ stock demand equa- 
tion (10). Thus, we see that the stock price coefficient of y, depends on the 
number of  type-i investors and on the strengths of their tendency to trade on 
useful information. The board’s  problem  is made easier if  investors have a 
systematic tendency to (1) become informed about or (2)  trade on information 
about the high-value managerial activities. 
We divide our discussion of  the results of the model into two parts for con- 
venience:  The first part takes  A  as exogenous, though  informed  investors’ 
trading behavior is endogenous. Thus, the results in this part answer the ques- 
tion, Does informed investors’ trading behavior make the stock price a better 
instrument for the board’s managerial compensation problem? This is not such 
an unlikely prospect, because the informed trader of  type i observes a signal 
correlated with managerial activity x,. 
We  now show that informed investors’ trading behavior has no particular 
tendency to favor managerial activities for which  f’,  (x,) -  c’,($ is large. To 
make the results simple to state, we first treat a special case and then the more 
general problem. In the special case, the information structure of the problem 
is symmetric in that there are an equal number of  informed traders of each 
type and in that each @,  has the same variance and all pairs of 0’s have the 
same covariance. 
PROPOSITION  I  (symmetric information structure, exogenous A).  Suppose all 
of  the A, are the same, and that cov(O,, . . . ,On)  = cov(O,,,  . . . ,@,J for 
any permutation of  the activities. Then the behavior of  informed traders re- 
wards management for all activities equally, regardless of  their relative value. 
Proof. Equations  (5),  (lo), (1  I), and (12) determine the joint distribution of 
t  Y,  r! and Z. Under symmetry, PLpr  = P’, and a2(V  I y,,  P) = a*(V  1 y,,  P)  for 
any pair of i,  j  in any solution. The manager’s marginal incentive to perform 
activity i is 
this is set equal to 6c,($)/6xi  by  the manager. The second term in (15) is the 
contribution of informed trading to the managers’ marginal incentive. Under 
symmetry, it is the same for all i. 
A more general result follows the same logic. 
PROPOSITION  2 (arbitrary information structure, exogenous A).  Equilibrium 
outsider trading does not lead a stock-price-based compensation contract to 
differentially reward high-value activities (those with G flax, -  GcJGx, high) or 
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incentive  for managers to pei$orm activity xc  versus activity x,  is entirely de- 
termined by A and the joint distribution of 0. 
Proof. The joint distribution of F!  X  C: and Z, now possibly assymmetric, is 
determined by the same equations as in proposition  1. Thus, the relative size 
of p",p versus p",  and u2(V  I y,, P)  versus u2  (V ly,, P)  is entirely determined 
by the joint distribution of 0,  C: and Z, and by A. It does not depend onf,(x,) 
versusf,(x,)  or SC($/SX,  versus SC(@SX,. 
An even  sharper contrast can be  seen by  comparing the incentives deter- 
mined by the stock market versus the optimal incentives that the board would 
desire.  Holmstrom  and Milgrom  (1990) consider  the  problem  of  multitask 
performance incentives. They show (under weak restrictions) that the optimal 
incentive scheme rewards the activities at the margin according to 
where [ ] is used to indicate the  vector or matrix whose  typical  element is 
inside the brackets.  The stark differences are immediate. The optimal incen- 
tive depends (of course!)  on f 'i.  The equilibrium stock-price-based compen- 
sation scheme does not. Keeping the level of 2) fixed at the equilibrium point, 
the slopesi can be changed arbitrarily and the stock market's  behavior is un- 
changed. In particular, we can make an activity such as massaging the earn- 
ings report arbitrarily worthless,f',  near zero, and the stock market will con- 
tinue to emphasize it. The optimal incentive depends on the supply elasticities 
of effort (S*c/Sx,Sx,), and these are lacking in the stock-market equilibrium as 
well. Only the distribution of 0  is common to the two problems, and it plays 
very  different roles.  In (12),  we see that traders particularly emphasize the 
high-variance  0's. In the optimal contract, high-variance  signals are empha- 
sized less. 
Why do these results hold? The intuition is simple. Our investors trade on 
information to the extent that it gives them a capital gain. In equilibrium, this 
comes at the expense of uninformed traders, traders who observe a different 
signal, or noise traders. To make a capital gain, a trader wants to know about 
the future value of the firm,  f($,  not managerial value added, f.  The private 
value of information for trading is entirely determined by who knows it, or 
who knows variables correlated with it. It is unrelated to the value of the in- 
formation in compensation of managers. 
In a related paper (Paul  1990), one of us takes up the general question of 
the equilibrium information content of l?  With a general joint distribution for 
0  and  C:  on which signals do investors tend  to trade most heavily? For an 
important  class of  distributions  of  0  and  C:  equilibrium  informed outsider 
trading systematically weights the noisiest signals the most heavily. (See prop- 
ositions 2 and 3 in Paul 1990). As Paul (1990) points out, this is exactly the 
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maximized at x, = x,.  Instead of putting weight, as the optimal linear compen- 
sation package would, on the least noisily signaled effort, in Paul’s results the 
investors do the reverse. 
At this juncture it should be clear that there is no systematic tendency for 
trading by those investors holding that information the board would like to see 
reflected in the price. If anything, rather the reverse seems to be true. Outsider 
trading is guided by the logic of the stock market itself, not by the relationship 
between the stock market and the firm’s decision problem. 
5.5  Investor Research Decisions 
Yet  propositions  1  and 2 refer to an environment in which investors’ re- 
search is exogenous. The informativeness of P  is endogenous, but the infor- 
mation available to be reflected in P is not. Investors cannot pursue research 
opportunities focused on particularly valuable x,.  Would a model with endog- 
enous research effort have more favorable implications for the role of  stock- 
market compensation in management decision making? 
The simple answer is no. And the simple reason follows directly from the 
Grossman-Stiglitz equilibrium condition for endogenous research. Grossman 
and Stiglitz (1980)  assume that traders invest in becoming informed in signal 
i until their utility gain from trading on y, is just equal to the cost of the signal. 
The cost of effort to the manager and the value to the firm appear nowhere in 
this calculation. 
Let the research costs of aspect i be R,. Let the certainty equivalent of the 
return  to knowing 0,  be  V,.  Let the certainty-equivalent return  of an unin- 
formed investor be Vu.  Then A,, the mass of informed investors of type i,  rises 
until 
(17)  V, = Vu + R,. 
From Admati and Pfleiderer (1987),  proposition 3.2, we know that Vt -  Vu 
is equal to 
It is immediate from (18)  and (12)  that the return to purchasing signal i for the 
marginal investor is proportional to the tendency of  type-i investors to trade 
on their information,  other things equal. (The other things here include p”,, 
so this may be overstrong.  Yet  pyip  and u2(V  I yi,  P)  should move in opposite 
directions in the cross section of signals.) In particular, the return to the mar- 
ginal investor is exactly proportional to the strength of a trader’s response to a 
given forecast.  (See Admati and Pfleiderer  1987, equation 3.4.) It therefore 
should not be surprising that the marginal investor’s behavior will not be par- 
ticularly directed toward the high-value investments. 
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PROFWITION  3 Under the symmetry conditions of proposition 1,  and assuming 
RL  = R,, the mass if  informed investors of each type, A,,  is the same for all i. 
Thus, there is no tendency for endogenous information to  favor the high-value 
research activities. 
There seems little room left; the use of a stock-price-based compensation con- 
tract  does not  solve a multiple-decision  moral-hazard problem.  Although  it 
may possibly be good at eliciting overall  effort from managers,  it  has very 
little role in focusing managers on those particular activities that create share- 
holder  wealth  over the  long  run. This result  may  help  explain  the  CEO- 
compensation puzzle. Jensen and Murphy (1989) try to measure the empirical 
relationship between CEO compensation and growth in shareholder wealth. 
They find a weak relationship, suggesting CEOs are nor compensated primar- 
ily according to rl  Why might this be? Suppose the long career path to becom- 
ing a CEO weeds out all candidates who disvalue overall effort, leaving only 
the driven.  Then our results show that there is no value to using the stock 
market in focusing the CEOs efforts; other mechanisms must be employed for 
that. 
5.6  The Value of Externally Generated Information in Managerial 
Decision Making 
In the second theory  of valuable  information in the stock price,  it  is the 
firm’s managers and board who learn from it. Part of this theory is similar to 
that of the last section. Outsider traders research the firm and discover profit- 
able new opportunities. To the extent that they trade on this research, they bid 
up the price of its shares. Yet part of this theory is different as well; in it, the 
firms’ managers  do not know  about the profitable  opportunities but  instead 
learn about them from observing the share price. 
This story is usually told in a slightly different way, in which it is thejrm’s 
cost ofcapital that is signaled to the managers and the board through its share 
price.  Suppose outsider  traders,  basing  their  decisions on private  research 
about fundamentals, drive up the share price. The resulting low cost of capital 
(rightly) means the firm should acquire additional capital and expand. Baumol 
(1965) points out that the informational story does not critically turn on the 
true marginal opportunity cost of capital to the firm. The new project could 
be financed out of  retained earnings, so that there is no relation between the 
share price and marginal opportunity cost of capital. This does not affect the 
argument that the stock price might signal valuable opportunities to the man- 
agers and board. Indeed, the main point here is not about investment of new 
capital at all, but instead about the use of the stock price by insiders to gain 
useful information about the firm’s prospects. 
A similar role for the stock price is central to q-theory models of investment 
(Tobin 1969; Hayashi 1982). It is easy to see, however, that there is no rela- 
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ity of  the valuable-information theory. In the q model, the origin of the infor- 
mation  about  new  projects  is unimportant.  I4  Management  can research  the 
profitable  new  opportunities  and  tell  analysts  about  them.  Alternatively, 
people outside the company can have done the research, and management can 
have inferred the opportunity from the high stock price. In either event, q > 1 
and the firm should expand. The usefulness of q-theoretical models in econo- 
metric studies of investment, therefore, has nothing to do with the direction 
of information flow. 
The value of increased stock-price informativeness, however, does turn crit- 
ically on the direction of information flow. There is little informational value 
for managers  in having the stock price quickly  reflect things they have just 
told analysts. If outside analysts learn something about new projects that man- 
agers do not know and trade on it to the point it is reflected in the share price, 
then there is an informational gain. Managers, seeing opportunities reflected 
in the share price, can move to fund the projects.I5 
This section has a very simple model of this potential information flow. The 
model suggests that the flow cannot be very important. The key assumption 
of  the model is that the stock price reflects two kinds of outsider trading and 
research. The outsiders can research and trade on information about the firm’s 
incremental  projects.  But  they  can also research  and trade  on information 
about the firms’ existing projects.  Securities prices confuse these two effects 
and thus provide a poor signal of the value of the incremental projects. 
We can reuse much of the notation  and many of the ideas of the previous 
section.  We  continue to assume that the ultimate value of the firm is deter- 
mined as 
where  is a vector of choice variables for management, and 0  is a random 
term outside anyone’s control. But for our purposes in this section, the inter- 
pretation  of  the  variables  changes  somewhat.  First,  management  and  the 
board together pick t,  and we assume here that they have no agency conflicts. 
All 3 are already decided except xn,  the new project. Further, we think of x,  as 
a single golno-go decision; undertake the project or not. 
The information structure is as follows: Management knows all of  theJ(xi) 
except f,(x,).  The value of  the  incremental  project, f,(x,)  + 0,  - c, is a 
normal random variable. Management knows none of the oi,  nor can they be 
14.  Indeed, Hayashi’s formal model (1982) has no private information at all. All investors are 
equally informed, and the stock price reflects fundamentals. This is all that  is needed for a q- 
theory model. 
15.  As far as we can detect, few managers claim to be  the recipients of  such signals, and few 
investors the senders.  Yet  they would not; managers do not lightly admit that outsiders know 
anything useful about their companies, and successful outsider traders earn more if they keep their 
own counsel. The exception is investors who have taken large positions in firms and who use 
takeover threats, seats on the board, and other large-scale mechanisms to compel policy changes. 
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learned by management.  Outside traders can research any or all of the Y, = 
f;(x,) + Oi,  including Yn =  f,(x,) + 0,. 
What management and the board would like to learn is the expected value 
of the new project, f,(x,,) - c. If  they could directly research  the signal Y", 
they would have a noisy (because of 0,)  signal of this. It is clearly (privately) 
cheaper to let the outsider traders do the research and to use the stock price as 
a signal. To investigate the information management can glean from this strat- 
egy, we investigate the distribution of the price of the firm's stock under the 
assumption that the incremental project is going to go fonvard.I6 
The trading,  research,  and other activities of outsider traders go forward 
exactly as in section 5.1, above. In particular,  the equilibrium distribution of 
the stock price is determined by (1  2): 
The implications of this are immediate and straightforward. The stock price, 
as a signal for Y,, is noisy, potentially very noisy. Consider, for example, the 
case in which there are nine existing projects  and the distribution  of the Y's 
and V is symmetric in the sense of proposition 1,  and that all the Y's  are inde- 
pendent.  Then P  is an equally weighted average of ten signals, only one of 
which is of interest (and also a function of the pure noise z). There is once 
again no necessary relationship between the pattern of information collection 
that would support the real-side decision making of  the firm and the pattern 
that  self-interested  outsider  traders  would  consider.  The real-side  decision 
needs information about the marginal project; outsider traders care about the 
totality of the firms' projects. 
Of course, if the signals Yi  are all highly correlated, the stock price will be 
a good signal for Y,. In this case, the distribution of the marginal project and 
all the inframarginal projects are much the same, and P  is highly correlated 
with the signal. Yet there is something very odd about this example, in which 
the managers do not know the value of the incremental project despite its high 
correlation with the inframarginal projects. 
For a firm that is growing rapidly, the value of the incremental project can 
dominate in overall firm valuation. Then the financial markets may well guide 
investment. A variety of financial institutions reflect this. Venture capitalists 
certainly  decide much  about  the  allocation of  capital  to young  firms.  For 
somewhat older firms, the initial public offering process can involve an infor- 
mation flow to managers from investment bankers and institutional investors. 
Yet  it is difficult to see how the same information flow could be important for 
16. We assume, for purposes of the discussion, that there are no tricky gaming issues between 
management and the outsider traders. Suppose, for example, that management will withdraw the 
project if the stock-market reaction is adequately adverse. Then the value of the security reflects 
this prospect, and (12) does not hold. Considerations such as this can only complicate manage- 
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a mature firm or how capitalizing information into the stock price in minutes 
instead of days can add much value.’’ 
We  can state the  general point easily in Hayashi’s language (1982). The 
board and the managers would like to know marginal q,  the incremental value 
to the firm of doing the additional project. Outsider traders’ profits depend on 
average q, not marginal q. Thus the signal-to-noise ratio in P  can be arbitrarily 
small, as in the case of an incremental project that is one nth of  the firm and 
distributed independently of the inframarginal projects. 
5.7  Conclusion 
How rapidly has the real output of stock exchanges grown? Is it anything 
like as rapid as figure 5.1 suggests? Are the rapidly growing costs of having 
stock exchanges (fig. 5.2) merely the flow of  resources into a sector making a 
booming social contribution? On balance, our analysis is not encouraging to 
a positive view on these issues. The gaps between social and private incen- 
tives to trade seem likely to be important in the modem era. 
Neither of  the two informational  theories of the real output of  the stock 
exchange suggests a large value for the increased activity of outsider traders. 
In both cases, the information that is valuable for making a real decision- 
compensating managers or deciding on a new project-bears  no relation  to 
the information impounded  in prices by the activities of traders. The appro- 
priate real decisions depend on value added-the  value of the managers’ de- 
cisions or of  the new projects. The research and trading decisions of outsider 
traders are focused on the value of the firm, not on value added. 
One of  the best  ways to become a clichC  is to be a truth.  Researching  a 
firm’s quarterly  earnings report in the days after the end of  the quarter but 
before the report is released may well be an excellent way to make a capital 
gain. At the same time, it could have no value in guiding management and 
could  advance the date at which the board has  a reasonable assessment of 
management performance  by only a few days. Increased liquidity  increases 
the resources devoted to this sort of rent seeking, without improving any real 
investment decisions. 
Our analysis has not addressed takeovers, mergers, or the market for cor- 
porate control more generally. Traders in our analysis seek trading profits, not 
changes in control of the company. It is clear that a large trader seeking new 
management,  a seat on the board, or other changes in the governance of the 
enterprise links real decisions and financial markets in a very direct way.’* It 
is an interesting and difficult question whether recent trends on the stock ex- 
17.  We have also ignored any potential value of  information about the firm to third parties, 
such as the owners or managers of other firms. 
18.  See Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1989). They model the role a low stock price might have 
in  attracting  takeovers,  and  the  managers’  resulting desire  to  pick projects  the  stock-market 
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changes help or hinder this process. On the one hand, increased liquidity per- 
mits outsiders with valuable changes in corporate governance in mind to move 
more quickly.  Yet such actors are typically held back by regulatory  restric- 
tions, which do not bind the arbitrageurs whose free riding is also enhanced 
by liquidity. 
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